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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA M. BURKE, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
RICHARD C. BURKE, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20404 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court erred in a divorce proceeding in 
determining that property that had been acquired during the 
marriage in the name of a corporation was actually marital 
property and therefore, an asset of the marriage to be divided 
between the parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this proceeding, appellant was the defendant in a divorce 
action filed by his wife as civil number D-15225, in the Third 
Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The 
parties were initially divorced in 1979 but all other issues 
concerning child custody, support and property were reserved to a 
later time for a trial. The matter came on for trial on October 
24, 1980, before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, sitting without 
a jury. Memorandums were requested by the court and on November 
10th, 1980, the court entered a minute entry decision. Findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and the decree of divorce were not 
entered in the matter until September 7, 1984, and an appeal from 
that decision was taken to this court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant requests that this court reverse the decision 
of the trial court with respect to certain parcels of real estate 
which were awarded jointly to the parties and rule that all such 
property was corporate property belonging to Advance Business 
Equipment, Inc. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties in this action were married in 1960 and lived 
together as husband and wife until approximately March, 1977, 
when the wife filed for divorce in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in civil number 
D-15225. 
On April 6, 1967, the appellant, along with others, formed a 
corporation known as Advance Business Equipment, Inc. (See R. 
Exhibit "11") The corporation existed continually until the time 
of 'the parties divorce and, in fact, is an operating entity at 
the present time. The corporation has had various officers and a 
board of directors that met at various times and held 
stockholders meetings at least once a year. The corporation's 
charter was never revoked or suspended by the State of Utah and 
the corporation was, at the divorce hearing in October of 1980, 
and is currentlyr in good standing with the State of Utah. The 
appellant is and has been the president of the corporation during 
its duration and at various times has held between 25% and 50% of 
the stock, either personally or with the ability to vote the 
stock held by his children. During the life of the corporation, 
it has had approximately eight additional stockholders, with the 
amount of stock held varying at any given time. There have 
s -
always been at least three stockholders in addition to the 
defendant and his children. (See R. Exhibit Ml", the corporate 
record book showing stock issued, the corporate minutes and other 
activities of the corporation.) 
The corporation operated as a closed operation with the 
stock being held by the appellant, his children and other 
stockholders. The nature of the business was to supply and 
distribute various types of business equipment as a wholesaler. 
(See R. articles of incorporation Exhibit "1") All transactions 
conducted by Advance Business during it's life have been 
conducted as a corporation, including the use of sales receipts, 
letters, other documents, etc. They all bear the corporate named 
and are signed by Richard Burke as president of the corporation. 
(See R. p.144, defendant's memorandum and Exhibits which were 
introduced at the time of the trial.) 
On three occasions prior to the parties divorce, the 
corporation purchased three separate pieces of real estate. The 
first transaction took place on June 15, 1970, when the 
corporation purchased, for investment purposes, a dwelling 
situated on approximately one-third of an acre with an adjacent 
two and one-half acre pasture and an adjacent building lot. A 
mortgage was obtained at Ogden First Federal in the name of 
Advance Business Equipment, Inc., and all payments on the 
mortgage were made by Advance Business Equipment. Approximately 
three months after the acquisition of the property, the parties 
moved into the home and used the same as their residence, until 
1977 when the defendant was forced to leave. The respondent 
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continued to reside in the home and the company made the monthly 
mortgage payments. (See R. corporate minute book, Exhibit "11"f 
minutes of the meeting of June 15, 1970.) 
The second transaction took place later in 1970, when the 
corporation acquired approximately 15 acres of raw, undeveloped 
land now known as Pepperwood. This acquisition was in the form 
of a contract for the purchase of land between Advance Business 
Equipment, Inc. and H.R. Fisher who owned the property in fee 
simple. The contract called for one yearly payment. The company 
paid the annual payment until 1976 when, because the company was 
unable to make the payment, the property was transferred to 
Sandra Maxwell, the sister of the defendant. Maxwell assumed the 
existing contract between Advance Business and H.R. Fisher. (See 
R. appellant1s and defendant's memorandum p.144 and 153.) 
The third transaction took place on June 14, 1978, when a 
building lot was acquired by the company in a subdivision known 
as Dimple Dell. The company purchased the lot in the company 
name pursuant to a resolution of the board of directors. (See R. 
Exhibit "11", minutes of the meeting of June 14, 1978.) 
Following the trial of this matter on October 24, 1980, the 
trial judge required memorandums from the parties, (See R. p.144 
and 153) and specifically requested that the parties address the 
issue of whether or not Richard Burke was the alter ego of 
Advance business, or in effect, whether the corporate veil of 
Advance Business could be pierced with respect to the three 
property transactions set forth above. The court, after 
reviewing the memorandums, ruled, as set forth in the findings of 
* -
fact and conclusions of lav; and the decree of divorce, (Exhibit 
"1" and "2" to this brief) that the property consisting of the 
home and the adjoining pasture land was marital property and the 
home was awarded to the respondent and the pasture land to the 
defendant. The building lot the Dimple Dell subdivision was 
marital property and was awarded jointly to the parties, but the 
15 acres in Pepperwood was not marital property and therefore, 
would not dispose of it in the divorce. 
Because the appellant believes that this ruling is 
inconsistent in light of the facts presented, this appeal v/as 
taken in an effort to clarify that actual status of the property 
in question. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in determining that the Pepperwood 
property was not marital property but in finding that the 
parties1 residence, the adjoining pasture land and the Dimple 
Dell lot were marital property. That the proper ruling should 
have been that all property in question belonged to the 
corporation, that the appellant herein was not the alter ego and 
that none of the property, therefore, was marital property 
subject to disposition in the divorce proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
The question before this Court in the instant case does not 
sound in domestic relations but sounds in corporations. The 
relief the appellant seeks is based upon the clear pronouncements 
of this Court in a number of cases which establish the guidelines 
for examining the actual existence and viability of a corporation 
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and whether or not that entity is truly a corporation or is 
merely the alter ego or a shell for the operation of a single 
individual. There is no factual dispute in this case as to the 
establishment and existence of the corporation known as Advance 
Business Equipment, Inc. There is no factual dispute that that 
corporation purchased the property in question and made the 
payments on it. There is no factual dispute that at the time of 
the initiation of the divorce and at the time of the actual 
divorce trial, all three of the properties were held in the name 
of Advance Business Equipment, Inc., and had never been in the 
name of either of the parties to the divorce. The only question 
then is was the corporation really the alter ego of Richard Burke 
or was it, pursuant to this Court's guideline, an bone fide 
corporation and therefore, the property in question would not 
have been part of the marital estate subject to disposition in 
the divorce proceedings by Judge Baldwin. 
Utah law is clear as to the requirements for disregarding 
the corporate entity upon a claim that the corporation is merely 
an extention of an individual. It should be carefully noted that 
this Court is a court of equity, and should pierce the corporate 
veil only after great caution is exercised and not precipitantly 
and that each case involving the existence or non-existence of 
the corporate entity must rest upon it's special facts and 
circumstances. (See Corporation §14 18 Am Jur 2d.) The burden 
of proof is upon the party moving to have the corporation shield 
set aside, or in this case, the respondent in the trial court. 
In Utah, three decisions of this Court have enunciated the 
*1-
requirements that a trier of fact must consider in determining 
whether the moving party has met the burden, thus setting aside 
the corporate entity. 
In the case of Dockstader v. Walker, 510 P.2d 526 (Utah 
1973), Justice Ellett, writing for a unanimous court, stated as 
fo]lows: 
Ordinarily a corporation is regarded 
as a legal entity, separate and apart from 
the stockholders, but the corporation veil 
which protects stockholders from liability 
for debts of the corporation will be 
pierced and true relationship between 
stockholders and corporation looked at 
where legal entity is used to perpetrate a 
fraud, to justify a wrong, or to defeat 
justice. 
The term "alter ego" is used to 
describe a situation where courts go behind 
corporate entity and hold a stockholder liable 
for debts of the corporation or to hold that 
it is the stockholder and not the corporation 
which owns the assets. 
The "alter ego" doctrine is generally 
applied to situation known as "one-man corporation," 
i.e., where one man owns practically all of the 
stock , either directly or through others who hold 
it for his use and benefit, and where stockholder 
uses the corporation as a shield to protect him 
from debts or wrongdoings; it cannot be applied to 
make stockholder liable for legitimate debts of the 
corporation unless he is so closely allied with the 
corporation through ownership and management as 
to enable courts to see clearly that corporate entity 
is but a sham and it is the stockholder who is doing 
business behind the corporate shield. (Id at 371, 
emphasis added.) 
This concept was further amplified by Justice Maughan, again 
writing for a unanimous court, in Norman v. Murray First Thrift & 
Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979), wherein the following 
comment was made: 
In order to disregard corporate 
entity...there must be a concurrence of 
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two circumstances: (1) there must be such 
unity of interest and ownership that the 
separate personalities of the corporation 
and the individual no longer exist, 
(i.e. vis the corporation is, in fact, 
the alter ego of one or a few individuals), 
and (2) observance of the corporation form 
would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, 
or an inequitable result would follow. 
(Id at 1030) 
Most recently, in the case of Messick v. PHD Trucking 
Service, 678 p.2d 791 (Utah 1984), Justice Hall further refined 
the doctrine set out by Justice Maughan in Norman when he said: 
The first prong of the test is often 
termed the "formalities requirement," 
referring to the corporate formalities 
required by statute. It is established 
upon a showing of the corporation's failure 
to observe said statutory formalities. The 
test's second prong is addressed to the 
conscience of the court, and the circumstances 
under which it will be met will vary with each 
case. 
He further goes on to say that: 
In examining evidence by which a trial 
court should be upheld in disregarding a 
corporate entity, the court would look at 
the following: evidence of the corporation's 
neglect of statutory formalities, and evidence 
that the observance of a corporate entity 
would sanction a fraud or promote injustice or 
inequitable results. (jCd at 794) 
There is no question in this case that all of the corporate 
formalities were observed by Advance Business Equipment in 
conducting itfs business, including the purchase of the property 
in question. The only real issue is the conscience of the court 
and whether or not the observance would sanction a fraud, promote 
injustice or an inequitable result. In effect, that is what 
Judge Baldwin was called upon to determine after hearing the 
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testimony and reviewing the exhibits in this case at the trial in 
October of 1980, His ruling, however, is inconsistent and 
therefore, we are unable to determine precisely what he found 
concerning this second prong of the test. On the one hand, he 
determined that the Pepperwood property which was, in effect, 
purchased by the corporation and then sold to a third party was 
corporate property and not subject to his decision. On the 
other, he find the Dimple DeJl and the pasture land and home to 
be marital property and divided that between the two parties. It 
was the same corporation involved, the same type of activities, 
the same status and yet the ruling is inconsistent. 
It is appellant's position that the only consistent ruling, 
given the facts presented, would be that all of the property was 
corporate property and that it was not marital property subject 
to distribution by the court in a divorce proceeding. There was 
no indication of fraud, and no indication of injustice. 
Appellant concedes that perhaps the result may appear to be 
inequitable if one looks at the property purely in a sense of 
what each of the parties received from the divorce proceedings. 
It only becomes inequitable, however, if we determine that the 
appellant received all of the property personally and the 
defendant had nothing. This, of course, was not the case. The 
proper result would have been that the corporation, of which the 
appellant is a stockholder, but only one of many, would have 
received the use and benefit of the property. In addition, the 
respondent received the use and benefit of the home and the 
property during the course of the marriage, and received the bulk 
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of the personal property that the parties acquired during their 
marriage. Therefore, if one assumes the existence and the 
viability of the corporation and that it is the corporation that 
would receive the property, if this decision were reversed, 
rather than the appellant, then there is no inequity or injustice 
present. 
Appellant believes that the trial court cannot have it both 
ways. It cannot find one piece of property as a non-marital 
asset and the others as marital assets when all of the facts 
concerning the acquisition of the property in the name of 
corporation and distribution of the property were the same. This 
inconsistency clearly demonstrates an abuse of discretion by the 
court and a decision which is clearly erroneous in light of the 
evidence and therefore, is the proper subject for a reversal by 
this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this court, in 
furtherance of itfs corporate doctrine set forth in the cases 
cited herein, review the findings of the trial court and 
determine that the property in question belonged to Advance 
Business Equipment and not to the parties and therefore, was not 
the subject of distribution in a marital estate in a divorce 
proceeding, and reverse the lower court's decision and restore 
the property in question to Advance Bvtsir/ess Equipment, Inc. 
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i R TFF D ! ! '.'?)•' : FT COURT 
COUNrrV OK SALT FAKK, STATU OR UTAH 
PATRICIA M. FURKF,
 % : 
K1NDJNGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OK RAW 
NUNC PRO TUNC 
vs. : 
• Civil No. 0-1^25 
RICHARD C. BURKE, 
Defendant. : 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on 
the 24th day of October, 1980, before tfte Honorable Ernest F. 
Baldwin, Jr., one of the judges of the above entitled court, 
sitting without a jury, plaintiff being personally present and 
represented by counsel, Gerald Gundry. and defendant being 
personally present ?.nd represented by counsel, John T. C a m e , and 
testimony having been taken over a period of two days, and the 
court also requesting the filing of written memorandum, arte: after 
reviewing all or the evidence arid the memorandums of the parties, 
and the court h e m e fully udvis.od in the premises, now find .^  as 
foilows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the parties were previously divorced by this court. 
on September \ (\ , 1.977 and the court, therefore, for the purpose 
of this iieariiiO, was to dispose or 'ho mar j t .« j prop* i i \; . 
2. That pU:inti f; if. a tit arc proper person to nave riv 
care, custodv and conrrol '..•; the owe minor children o: ; ho 
parties, with reasonably' rights r. f visitation in the die fondao t . 
3. That plaintiff is in need -of child support and 
defendant's income would allow for the payment of $ 1 fa) per month 
per child, for a total of S3 00 per month. 
4. That the defendant is in arrears in child support from a 
previous order of the court in the sum of $6,900. 
5. That plaintiff is able bodied and presently employed, 
and is in no need of alimony. 
6. That the parties' home and the adjoining acreage, 
located at 4596 South 785 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, is marital 
property and the home should be awarded to the plaintiff and the 
adjoining acreage should be awarded to the defendant. That each 
party should assume and discharge any debt against the property 
awarded to him or her, and hold the other harmless therefrom. 
"7. That the parties' building lot in Dimple Del Subdivision 
#2 and their cabin site in Island Park, Idaho, are marital 
property and should be awarded equally to the parties. 
8. That the 15 acres o: unimproved property, known as 
Pepper Wood, is not marital property and, therefore, no action 
should be taken by the court concerning its disposition. 
9. That the plaintiir should bo awarded aJi of the 
furniture, fixtures and wares located in her possession with the 
exception of the following items currently in tier possession, 
which should be awarded to thr: de !V-ndapt : the Navaho Indian rug, 
the Remington pi ;: • • , <\ s't • •! silver in Mil::, ,) J;<J ;J:I in*? of - :•-•-• a 
sca;.c, a painting <d an "indi.u:, - book of the Old West , u o; o: 
which should be awarded ;• o the oe ; • mclan t . T p. add i * ion, eo toucan, t 
.15; awarded h.is grandmother's br."i:-s bell , an i ndiar: Cv r<-;o ;n i a ! 
rue, one of the throe other .Indian rugs, three pen sro-tches, 
three hafen family history books auo one-half of all the 
ographs. 
.10. That defendant should be awarded all of his interest i.u 
the company kno\-Jn as Advanced business Equipment. 
11. That each party .should assume and discharge their own 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court concludes as 
follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the plaintiff should be awarded custody of the 
parties two minor children, subject to reasonable visitation in 
:! the defendant. 
2. That the defendant should be ordered to pay the sum of 
$150 per month per child as and for child support, for a total o:' 
$30 0 per month. 
3. That 'judgment should be entered against the defendant 
for $6,900 for chile support arrearages to date. 
4. That the n 1 a i n t i. \ I should not bo awarded any aiimonv row 
or in the future. 
5. That plaintii't should be awarded the home at 4596 South 
785 East, Salt bake City, Utah. The defendant should be awarded 
the adied r*i ng acreage to the home. That each party should assume 
and discharge :\:\y Mebt niifiiimt. the pru['ori;y ar'.d hob: ' he <M..h«-r 
harmless there f rem. 
6. That the building lot. in Dimple Del Subdivision. -12 an»: 
the cabin site in Island Park, Idaho, should be riVJ^raoc: equally 
to the parties. 
7. That the 15 acres of unimproved property known as Pepper 
Wood is not marital property, and, therefore, no action should be 
taken by the court concerning its disposition. 
8. That the plaintiff should be awarded all of the 
furniture, fixtures and wares located in her possession with the 
exception of the following items currently in her possession, 
which should be awarded to the defendant: the Navaho Indian rug, 
the Remington prints, a set of silver prints, a painting of a sea 
scape, a painting of an Indian, a book of the Old West, all of 
which should be awarded to the defendant. In addition, defendant 
should be awarded his grandmother's brass bell, an Indian 
ceremonial rug, one of the three other Indian rugs, three pen 
sketches, three Hafen faraily history books and one-half of all 
the photographs. 
9. That defendant should be awarded all of his interest in 
the company known as Advanced Business Equipment. 
10. That each party should assume and discharge their own 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action and hold the 
other harmless therefrom. 
DATED this day of August, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
FiRNEST F . BALDWIN, J R . 
DISTRICT r n i u r r .innr.P 
John T. Caine of 
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS 
Attorney for Defendant 
2 568 Via s h i n g ton Bou lev a r d 
Ogden, Utah 84 4 01 
Telephone: 393-5367 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA M. BURKE, : 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiff, : NUNC PRO TUNC 
vs . 
RICHARD C. BURKE, 
Defendant. 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on 
the 24th day of October, 1980, before the Honorable .Ernest R. 
Baldwin, judge of the above entitled court, sitting without a 
jury, and plaintiff being personally present and represented by 
counsel, Gerald Gundry, and defendant being personally present 
and represented by counsel, John T. Caine, and testimony having 
been taken over a period of two days, and the court also 
requesting the filing of written memorandum, and after reviewing 
all of the evidence and the memorandums of the parties, and the 
court being fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore 
signed and entered herein its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, NOW, THEREFORE, 
ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That the parties were previously divorced by this court 
on September 16, 1977, and the court, therefore, for the purpose 
of this hearing, was to dispose of the marital property. 
2. That the plaintiff shall be awarded the custody of the 
parties1 two minor children, subject to reasonable visitation in 
the de fendant. 
3. That "judgment shall be entered against the defendant foi 
$6,900 for child support arrearages to date,*/. {^^t o b^^J I ^ & & 
4. That the plaintiff shall not be awarded any alimony now 
or in the future. 
5. That plaintiff shall be awarded the home at 4596 South 
785 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. The defendant shall be awarded 
the adjoining acreage to the home. That each party shall assume 
and discharge any debt against the property and hold the other 
harmless therefrom. * 
6. That the building lot in Dimple Del Subdivision #2 and 
the cabin site in Island Park, Idaho', Hshaxl be awarded equally/to 
the parties. &-*& t ^ Z ^ ^ A ^ &^<u^ ^^v^c^w^ 
7. That the 15 acres of unimproved property knownL^s Pepper <^ r 
Wood is not marital property, and, therefore, no action shall be 
taken by the court concerning its disposition. 
8. That the plaintiff shall be awarded all of the 
furniture, fixtures and wares located in her possession with the 
exception of the following items currently in her possession, 
which shall be awarded to the defendant: the Navaho Indian rug, 
the Remington prints, a set of silver prints, a painting of a sea 
scape, a plaintiff of an Indian, a book of the Old West, all of 
which shall be awarded to the defendant. In addition, defendant 
shall be awarded his grandmother's brass bell, an Indian 
ceremonial rug, one of the three other Indian rugs, three pen 
sketches, three Hafen family history books and one-half of all of 
the photographs. 
9. That defendarit shall be awarded all of his interest in 
the company known as Advanced Business Equipment. 
10. That each party shall assume and discharge their own 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action and hold the 
other harmless therefrom. s / / t*^s<zj?'-
DATED this ^7 day of^^tnrtr, 1984. ~ £/=:/~<?<r/7>i/-* &cS0U**<^ 
/<?7o. BY THE GO \Xfptf: 
.^tfjd^ 
RN-EST F. BALDWIN X^JR 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
